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  Abstract 
 
This essay will demonstrate the nexus between philosophical dialogue and political action by 
analyzing the work of Leonard Nelson and his disciples Gustav Heckman and Minna Specht. The 
central question is: “In which sense can a dialogical education be considered as a political action?” 	
In the 1920s and 1930s, Nelson promoted Socratic dialogue amongst his students as a practice of 
freedom in opposition to the rising Nazi power. Nelson understood that to educate the new 
generation through a very participative model of philosophical inquiry that privileged critical 
thinking and autonomy was the best form of resistance. Minna Specht’s idea of education for 
confidence gave to this dialogical practice a very innovative dimension, which led her to be 
engaged with UNESCO’s educational programs in post-war Germany. In this way, the Socratic 
dialogue faced history. 	
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 Introduction 
 
How can a dialogical education be defined as a political action?	To answer this question, I will 
compare the ancient Socratic method with the ways Leonard Nelson, Gustav Heckmann and Minna 
Specht have enacted it.1 In particular, I will underline the traits shared by dialogical education and 
political action, including the philosophical dimension. I will consider the German formulation of 
the Socratic dialogue as this model is, even today, characterized by a fundamental element of 
political engagement. Arguably, the German formulation represents a good example to discuss the 
role of dialogue when facing historical challenges. Thus, analyzing Nelson and his disciples’ 
biographies will also allow to comprehend the development of the German method – in both 
programmatic and factual terms – as a political action of resistance and struggle for freedom during 
National Socialism in Germany.  
	
 The Ancient Socratic Dialogue 
 
In order to approach the above topics, it is first necessary to summarize the defining traits of the 
ancient Socratic dialogue. This essay will not cross-examine the epistemological features of the 
Socratic method,2 since it is more relevant here to provide an account of the relevance of the 
method within the context of 5th/4th centuries BCE Athens. I will then be in a position to clarify in 
the section on “History and Dialogue” why the Socratic dialogue – as a philosophical practice 
developed later on by Nelson and others – faces the history. 	
 The literary genre of logoi sokratikoi emerges immediately after Socrates’ death in 399 BCE 
as a testimony of his life and philosophy. The first Platonic dialogues in this genre are clear 
examples of the philosophical practice that were popularized by Socrates, i.e., the dialogical 
inquiry. The method expresses not only the idea that knowledge should be pursued through 
dialogue, but also the notion of philosophy as a way of life that recognizes the moral and the 
political value of the achievement of knowledge.3 Therefore, philosophy appears to be the best form 
of education since it trains the philosopher to achieve virtue through the dialogical process of 
knowledge enquiry.	
 In fact, Plato’s Socratic dialogues emphasize the dialogical feature of the philosophical 
inquiry, employing a principal interlocutor (Socrates) who asks questions to seek definitions. A 
large number of Socrates’ interlocutors are composed of sophists, rhetoricians and politicians – in 
other words, by the foremost historical characters of the period who were the leaders of the actual 
regime. Socrates, by enacting dialogic strategies that vary depending on the interlocutor, brings to 
light the inconsistency of their opinions and, simultaneously, the incoherency of their ways of life. 
																																								 																				
1 The primary sources can be found here: Thomas Kite Brown, ed., Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy. Selected 
Essays by Leonard Nelson (New York: Dover Publications, 1965); Gustav Heckmann, Das sokratische Gespräch, 
Erfharungen in philosophischen Hochschulseminaren [Socratic dialogue, experiences in high school classes], 
(Hannover: Schroedel, 1981); Leonard Nelson, Gesammelte Schriften. Vol.1: Die Schule der kritischen Philosophie und 
ihre Methode [Collected Writings. Vol.1: The School of Critical Philosophy and its Method], (Hamburg: Felix Meiner 
Verlag, 1970); Leonard Nelson, “Die sokratische Methode. Vortrag, gehalten am 11. Dezember 1922 in der 
Pädagogischen Gesellschaft in Göttingen” [The Socratic method. Lecture held on the 11th of December 1922 in the 
Pedagogical Society in Göttingen], in Otto Meyerhof, Franz Oppenheimer, Minna Specht, eds., Abhandlungen der 
Fries'schen Schule. Neue Folge, Band, H. 1 [Friesian School’s memoirs. New Series, Volume, H. 1] (Göttingen: 
Öffentliches Leben, 1929) pp. 21–78; Minna Specht, Education for confidence. A school in exile (London: New 
Education fellowship, London 1944). 
2 For a complete analysis of the different tools in play within the elenchus, see Laura Candiotto, Le vie della 
confutazione. I dialoghi socratici di Platone [Ways of refutation. Plato’s Socratic dialogues], (Milano: Mimesis, 2012), 
“Aporetic State and Extended Emotions: the Shameful Recognition of Contradictions in the Socratic Elenchus”, Ethics 
& Politics, XVII, 2015(2), pp. 233–248. 
3 Pierre Hadot has underlied it for the Ancient Greek philosophy, especially for the Hellenistic Schools. See Pierre 
Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual exercises from Socrates to Foucault, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). 
The listeners – both internal and external to the dialogue – could therefore realize that their 
representatives were not worthy of their social role. In particular, through this public process of 
refutation, which merges the achievement of self-awareness to a profound critique of current events, 
the Athenians could reflect upon the crises of their time and eventually decide to act in order to 
oppose and overcome it. 	
 Furthermore, dialogue – in its Platonic approach – is displayed as this community of inquiry 
devoted to the acquisition of knowledge. In the Seventh Letter,4 Plato depicted philosophical 
practice as the activity pursued in a community with friends, all of them having knowledge as their 
main goal. The intersubjective dimension of the inquiry leads, thus, to the achievement of 
knowledge through intellectual cooperation, and mutual support amongst the interlocutors is 
required in order to overcome the difficulties that may be faced in the process of inquiry. 
Consequently, dialogue is configured as a procedure that leads to the achievement of the knowledge 
of the Good, and is recognised as the most valuable thing. 	
 Therefore, a dialogue is a social space where it is possible to recognize both one’s errors and 
those committed by the representatives of the city; in the meantime, it is also the intellectual 
arrangement through which, thanks to the elenctic purification from false judgments,5 it is possible 
to maieutically generate knowledge. Dialogical practice enables the participants to work upon 
themselves, to recognize the crises of their historical period, and to seek better strategies and 
lifestyles through the acquisition of knowledge. In his higher theoretical understanding, the dialogue 
assumes therefore a function of education to truth, which, according to Plato, is a constitutive 
element for the instruction not only of the philosophers, but of politicians as well.6 Dialogical 
practice thus enables the interlocutors to recognize the crises of their historical period and, thanks to 
the discovery of truth, seek a better way of life for their community.	
 
 The German Socratic Dialogue 
 
In this section, I will focus on the enactment of the Socratic dialogue in the contemporary period. 
The Socratic dialogue assumed various formulations through the years, especially in the Anglo-
Saxon and north European settings, and it is presently considered as one of the main philosophical 
practices operative today. It is applied, amongst other settings, in education, training and 
psychotherapy, as well as in decision-making and stimulating teamwork in legal and business 
contexts. Naturally, from both a methodological point of view and the perspective of the aims of 
this practice, it is possible to identify some discontinuities vis-à-vis the ancient method.7 However, 
the fundamental idea concerning the possibility of individual and collective betterment to be 
obtained by means of dialogical exchange amongst interlocutors remains the same. 	
																																								 																				
4 John M. Cooper, ed., Plato. Complete Works (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett, 1996). 
5 The elenchus is the procedure that tests out the interlocutor's beliefs through cross-examination. Its main function is to 
liberate the interlocutors from false beliefs. See  Laura Candiotto, “Purification through emotions. The role of shame in 
Plato's Sophist 230b4-e5,” in Educational Philosophy and Theory (2017) 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2017.1373338 
6 Plato’s Academy was presicely devoted to the philosophical education of the political leaders. As is well known, Plato 
argues in the Republic that it is the philosopher who should become king – or his counselor. Despite being elitist, this 
view elicits the idea that knowledge is a necessary requirement for the art of government, and that philosophy – in our 
case, the Socratic dialogue – is the method that permits to achieve this goal. 
7 For a concise overview of the key characteristics and differences, see Laura Candiotto, “Socratic dialogue: a 
comparison between ancient and contemporary method,” in M. Peters (ed.), Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy 
and Theory (Singapore: Springer, 2015 substantive revision), http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-
981-287-532-7_367-1. For an introduction to the different Socrates-inspired philosophical practices operating 
nowadays, see Michael Noah Weiss (ed.), The Socratic Handbook (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2015), and Marìa Carmen 
Sègura (ed.), El método socrático hoy. Para una enseñanza y práctica dialógica de la filosofía [The Socratic method 
today. For a dialogical teaching and practice of philosophy] (Madrid: Escolar y mayo). 
 The German version of the ancient dialogue, formulated by Leonard Nelson and his 
collaborators is, in my opinion, the version that remains more faithful to the political objectives that 
were so important in ancient times, even though it presents different ontological and 
epistemological points of reference. In point of fact, Nelson is a neo-Kantian who integrates the 
Kantian a-priori and transcendental philosophy with the psychologism of Jacob Friederich Fries, 
assigning thus to the dialogical experience a foundational role in the formulation of judgments. The 
clear reference to Kant and Fries pertains to the epistemological feature of the method. For 
Socrates, the starting point of the dialogical inquiry is the analysis of examples. For Nelson, the 
dialogue means the assurance of a very phenomenological dimension to the inquiry, without 
Socrates’ scepticism towards the exhaustiveness of the experience as a source of knowledge. 
Specifically, it is important for Nelson to ground the inquiry to the analysis of the judgments. As is 
well known, Kant has ascribed the role of critical examination of judgments to reason, since it is the 
faculty that judges the same faculty of thinking. But Kant’s theory of judgment systematically 
embeds judgments within the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. Nelson, following the 
Kantian tradition, albeit with a different connotation, understands judgments as those psychological 
instances embraced by the epistemic agent that have the power to inform and constitute their ways 
of life. Moreover, following Fries, he roots the practice of inquiry, i.e., our main duty motivated by 
the interest in truth, in the self-confidence of reason (the principle of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft) 
being able to achieve the exercise of criticism.	
 Starting from examples does not therefore imply the embracing of an empiricist account on 
knowledge, but instead implies the disclosure, analysis and challenges of those judgments that 
inform our daily life without our being aware of it. Moreover, starting from the experience means 
that, for Nelson, our knowledge is not simply propositional; a judgment is propositional, but 
analyzing the experience will provide us with the value of perceptual knowledge that is not 
propositional on its own although it is translatable in proposition. Therefore, following Fries, 
Nelson understands the production of knowledge as the synthetic unity of judgments and the 
immediate knowledge achievable through experience. In order to avoid the regressus in infinitum, 
judgments should be not grounded in prior judgements, but in something that is different from 
them, understood as non-intuitive immediate knowledge (nicht anschaulich unmittelbare 
Erkenntniss) of pure reason.8 One element of interest in Nelson’s theory, is that in order to achieve 
this kind of immediate knowledge, we should be engaged in dialogical inquiry, and not only, as per 
Fries, in introspection (Selbstbeobachtung). Thus, dialogical practice is a mediation or procedure 
that leads to non-intuitive immediate knowledge that Plato understood as the noetic realm of the 
ideas achievable through the long process of dianoetic inquiry.	
 In order to expound the characteristics of the German version of the Socratic method, a 
clarification of the historical circumstances underpinning its development is essential. This 
approach is vital since the German method emerged as a response to a specific historical situation, 
which required, according to Nelson and his disciples, the elaboration of appropriate strategies of 
intellectual resistance. Arguably, the political valence of the practice derives precisely from the 
Platonic account of the Socratic dialogue and not from the Kantian or Friesian heritage.	
 First, political activism: Nelson, disappointed by the neutral stance assumed by liberal youth 
movements during the First World War, initially founded the Society for the Study of Practical 
Philosophy (Studiengesellschaft für praktische Philosophie) in 1918, and later that year, the IJB 
(Der Internationale Jugen-Bund). These two groups aimed to create, within their society, ethical 
and political initiatives derived from Nelson and Fries’ philosophies. Nelson recognized the 
primacy of reason and thus fought for a politics rooted in rights and centred in principles of equality 
and freedom. While never becoming a party, the IJB was exclusively connected to the left, 
																																								 																				
8 For Fries, immediate knowledge is non-intuitive, and corresponds precisely to the Kantian meaning of perception. See 
Kelley L. Ross, “Non-Intuitive Immediate Knowledge,” Ratio, Vol. XXIX No. 2 (1987), available online: 
http://www.friesian.com/immedi-1.htm 
especially social democracy. In 1925, Nelson founded a party, the ISK (Internationaler 
sozialisticher Kampfbund), which, after his death in 1927, continued the resistance against National 
Socialism both within and outside Germany.	
 One of the achievements of the IJB was the foundation of the Political Philosophical 
Academy (PPA), which still exists today, whose goal was to educate future political leaders. This is 
the second aspect of Nelson’s activity: the application of the Socratic method to educate future 
politicians. In 1923, Nelson founded a new school dedicated to the education of children and adults, 
the Walkemühle, directed by Minna Specht. The school, requisitioned by the SS in 1933, was 
transferred first to Denmark, then to England, and finally to Wales. During the years of exile, the 
activities of the school focused specifically on the education of children and developed 
configurations in the light of different facets of Nelson’s theories. In fact, while Nelson can be 
considered as the thinker broadly at the origin of the German approach together with its 
philosophical justification, his disciples developed the method further through practice. Not only 
did they export the method outside of Germany, but they also ascribed to it a stable configuration. 
The method in question is nowadays equally taught in the education centres of PPA (Germany) and 
SFCP (England). In general terms, the Socratic dialogue was intended as a tool allowing 
participants to learn to think freely, detect errors and social scaffolding, while developing 
intellectual autonomy and rigour. The dialogue was meant to foster the experience of equality and 
freedom without focusing on the democratic principle of majority, which, according to Nelson, did 
not guarantee a real shared participation. The form of dialogue proposed by Nelson was rooted in an 
unwavering trust in reason (Kant) and in the possibility of achieving the knowledge of truth (Plato). 
However, the method was used not only for philosophical discussions or for conflict resolution, but 
also for didactic purposes and especially for lectures of mathematics and physics conducted by 
Heckmann. 
 The IJB, the PPA and the Walkemühle were also real experiences of communitarian life, 
characterized by a specific mode of existence, e.g., the refusal of luxury, an abandonment of the 
Church, abstinence from nicotine and tobacco, vegetarianism, manual work, and so on. In this 
perspective, the dialogue assumed the characters of a daily quest conducted in a community. The 
communitarian dimension was essential in considering the autonomy of thought, not as an 
individualistic endeavour but as a potentiality in the service of others and society. 
 After Nelson’s death, Heckmann and Specht moved to Berlin where they published a journal 
– der Funke – which is well known for having publically promoted an appeal to resistance against 
National Socialism. After her years of exile, Specht dedicated a long time to editing the 
philosophical works of Nelson and some of his personal writings, hoping that such experiences 
could promote the establishment of schools able to offer a pedagogy different from that imposed by 
National Socialism.  
 
 History and Dialogue 
	
Which amongst the aforementioned historical developments are the ones consistent with the ancient 
model?	The ideas of “academy” and “communitarian life” in particular strongly resonate with the 
Platonic model of Socratic dialogues. On the occasion of the Pedagogical Society of Göttingen 
conference held on 11 December 1922,9 Nelson frequently referred to the Seventh Letter. In fact, it 
is possible to find aspects of community life described by Plato in the Seventh Letter within the 
experiences of communitarian life that Nelson and his disciples promoted. The social dimension of 
the inquiry is not accessory: it is a necessary condition for the development of critical thinking, for 
the achievement of knowledge, and for the construction of a correct way of life that is consistent 
																																								 																				
9 Leonard Nelson, “Die sokratische Methode. Vortrag, gehalten am 11. Dezember 1922 in der Pädagogischen 
Gesellschaft in Göttingen” [The Socratic method. Lecture held on 11 December 1922 in the Pedagogical Society in 
Göttingen], 21–78.  
with thought. Furthermore, the formation of future politicians, which constitutes one main task 
pursued by the Philosophical Political Academy, is obviously a clear reference to Plato’s Academy, 
and it clearly illuminates the nexus existing – for Nelson – between philosophical and political 
education. 	
 Philosophy as a lifestyle is not an abstract and disembodied activity of reason. On the 
contrary, philosophy as a lifestyle faces the present time and in this sense encounters and conflicts 
with history. The Socratic dialogue, specifically, establishes a relational dynamic with history since 
it assumes its engagement not only as proof of reality for philosophy, as Plato claimed, but als, as 
far as the German method is concerned, by elaborating an educational method in response to 
Nazism and by being presented as a tool to prevent new genocidal acts.	
 Political activism is an aspect that can be hardly detected in the ancient method, at least in 
the way it is currently understood, i.e., in connection with a political program formulated by 
associations that promote particular forms of resistance and struggle. Socrates’ and Plato’s politics 
(however relevant the term may be) is situated in the field of education and tends to overlap with 
philosophy itself. Arguably, political activism represents a factor specific to Nelson’s method in its 
original formulation. This strong political dimension, as intended in its standard format, became 
less prominent in the works of his successors, who emphasized education and training without 
specifically considering the political significance of these activities. The possibility of spreading the 
method by means of written works, which, as previously mentioned, Heckmann and Specht 
undertook by creating a journal, can be considered as a key element to interpret the proliferation of 
the Socratic dialogue after Socrates’ death. This parallel, however, may too easily smack of 
interpretative anachronism, which would in another venue require further specification. 	
 Dialogue as a tool of resistance and education relates specifically to “history” as an 
awareness of the present and a responsibility for the future that motivates action. Therefore, facing 
history implies embracing the challenges of the present and responding to them through the tools at 
our disposal, in our case, philosophy and the Socratic dialogue. The notion of philosophy as way of 
life, which Pierre Hadot has depicted so well in the context of ancient Greece,10 acquires in the 
German version of the Socratic dialogue a new and more politically engaged dimension. As such, 
philosophy is not only an embedded practice; it really meets its “history” and aspires to the 
transformation of its development. It is not by chance that Michel Foucault found in Socrates one of 
the  heroes who had the courage to face the authorities with his philosophical life – the dialogue.11 
Similarly, unless there are clear differences between the Ancient and German dialogical methods, 
the common goal for philosophical practice may well be to face by means of the dialogue the 
history with all its figures of authority. 
 
 Socratic Dialogue as Political Action 
 
How can philosophical dialogue contribute to the education of future leaders? And, more radically, 
to what extent can dialogical education be defined as political action? According to Paolo 
Dordoni,12 Nelson’s pedagogical project can be comprehended only by taking into account the role 
political activism plays therein. Dordoni is right to frame the German model on the basis of political 
activism. This said, I suggest developing another aspect that may seem less political but, in my 
opinion, explains better why dialogical education may serve as political action to face history. I am 
referring to the political value of emotions in dialogue. Specht’s life experience is of the essence to 
																																								 																				
10 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life. Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. A. Davidson (Oxford: 
Wiley, 2016). 
11 Michel Foucault, The Courage of Truth. The Government of Self and Others II. Lectures at the College de France, 
1983-1984, translated by Graham Burchell (London-New York-Shangai: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
12 Paolo Dordoni, Il dialogo socratico. Una sfida per un pluralismo sostenibile [Socratic dialogue. A challenge for 
sustainable pluralism], (Milano: Apogeo, 2009), 37. 
demonstrate how the ethics of care embedded in her way of promoting Socratic dialogue is the 
ground for a philosophical education as prevention of future genocides. During her years of 
resistance in exile, Specht has been doing politics through philosophical education and, in this 
perspective, her philosophy as way of life can be arguably considered as more Platonic than that of 
Nelson himself. 
 In the Seventh Letter, Plato describes the difficulties in engaging in correct forms of political 
action within a compromised socio-historical situation:	
 
 As I observed these incidents and the men engaged in public affairs, the laws too and the 
 customs, the more closely I examined them and the farther I advanced in life, the more 
 difficult it seemed to me to handle public affairs aright. For it was not possible to be active 
 in politics without friends and trustworthy supporters; and to find these ready to my hand 
 was not an easy matter, since public affairs at Athens were not carried on in accordance with 
 the manners and practices of our fathers; nor was there any ready method by which I could 
 make new friends.13		
 
 Finally, it became clear to me, with regard to all existing communities, that they were one 
 and all misgoverned. For their laws have got into a state that is almost incurable, except by 
 some extraordinary reform with good luck to support it. And I was forced to say, when 
 praising true philosophy that it is by this that men are enabled to see what justice in public 
 and private life really is.”14  
 
Specht, similar to Plato, understood that in the context of National Socialism where direct avenues 
to political engagement were blocked, it was essential to create environments of friendship in 
which, thanks to philosophy, a new political generation could be forged. In this respect, she was 
true to Nelson, who, in agreement with the liberal Wilhelm Ohr, maintained the necessity to create 
educational-pedagogical communities for training a future political class. This view was also 
endorsed by Hermann Lietz who founded the first boarding schools, whose pedagogy remained 
authentically innovative until 1933. Moreover, after the fall of Nazism Specht created an 
educational model for those children who had experienced the horrors of the Second World War. 
 In this perspective, philosophical education does not only aim at training future politicians. 
Paraphrasing Specht, it also aims at building trust in humankind. It is not a didactic program 
reserved to a specific class of people (the future leaders), but a universal endeavour. Specht 
welcomed children of all ethnic origins and religions in her schools, notably – for the time – 
Germans, Jews, and Romani, with the aim at recognizing universal ties amongst individuals. 
Education is thus not only projected towards the future: it also aims at “repairing” the ills – in 
contemporary terms, “harm reduction” – caused by the Second World War. To achieve these ends, 
Specht focused, again, on establishing a philosophical community; hence, the creation of the 
Odenwald School, which run from 1946 to 1951. To broaden her scope of action and in addition to 
spreading Nelson’s thought by publishing his works, Specht collaborated with UNESCO until 1959. 
Her politics, therefore, became a positive practice of normative elaboration, (the centrality of 
Plato’s thought is evident here), striving to configure an educational context for the protection of 
children’s rights. Building on these premises, we may arguably formulate the questions that 
orientated Specht’s life in the post-war period as follows: “How to educate after totalitarianism?” 
and “How to regain trust in reason and in the capacity to grasp the truth after the horrors of the 
Second World War?” These two questions, albeit simplifying and generic, call to mind Hans Jonas’ 
																																								 																				
13 Plato, Seventh Letter, 325 c4–d2. 
14 Ibid., 326 a2–6. 
metaphysical dilemma: “How is it possible to think God after Auschwitz?”15	Specht’s answer was a 
continuous commitment to philosophical education, based on the firm belief that a better future 
could only be rooted in the education of a new generation. For Specht, philosophical education was 
to be rooted in the dialogue, intended as a philosophical method that allowed believing in one’s own 
potential through collaboration with others.16 Therefore, Specht’s experience provides evidence of 
the transformative power of philosophical dialogue as an educational device, both for those 
practicing it and for the context in which it is practiced. 	
 
 The Dialogue’s Powers 
	
Dialogue is a world-transformative action.17 Communicative action, by affecting public opinion, 
can be configured as the starting point of a possible political transformation. The work carried out 
in philosophical quest brings an answer to the need for ethical, political and social change – a 
change that is possible only through a conceptual transformation involving single citizens who are 
placed in relation with each other by establishing constructive communicative-dialogical contexts. 
However, how can the dialogue have an effect on power?	
 A theoretical foundation for the link between philosophical education based on dialogue and 
political intervention can be traced in different discourse theories. In my opinion, Jürgen Habermas’ 
accounts clearly depict what is achievable through the practice of the Socratic dialogue.18 Habermas 
replies to the question about the power of communicative agency by taking the example of a 
hydraulic system based on water locks.19 The transition of communication and decisions takes place 
through a periphery-centre channel based on the construction of public opinion. As in a hydraulic 
system, there are locks that allow or prevent the passage of communicative fluxes from the 
periphery to the centre. 	
 Civil society is composed of associations, corporations and movements that intercept and 
intensify, more or less spontaneously, problematic social situations and transmit them to the 
political public sphere. However, this transmission of knowledge does not take place at an 
institutional level only but also in more spontaneous forms that shape public opinion: dialogical 
interactions on a train, in the waiting room at a hospital, in the supermarket, or in immaterial 
contexts such as blogs and social networks on the web. Communication is enacted by both active 
social actors and those who listen and are influenced by what they listen to.  
 The informal knowledge constituted in these contexts, if it gains momentum, can open with 
its pressure – e.g., concrete demonstrations as well as appeals launched via the web – with the 
aforementioned hydraulic locks influencing the next level of the hydraulic system. The 
communication system between centre and periphery, however, is constituted by fluxes moving	not 
only from the latter towards the former, but also in reverse. Communication from the centre to the 
periphery is often more influential as it is facilitated by the use of more powerful means of 
communication. Unfortunately, various conditioning messages that weaken the free-thinking 
																																								 																				
15 Hans Jonas, “Der Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz. Eine jüdische Stimme” [The Concept of God after Auschwitz. A 
Jewish Voice], in Fritz Stern, Hans Jonas, Reflexionen finsterer Zeit [Reflections of dark time] (Mohr: Tübingen, 1984).  
16 Minna Specht, Education for Confidence. A School in Exile. See also Rene Saran, Barbare Neisser, eds., Enquiring 
Minds. Socratic Dialogue in Education, (London: Trentham Books, 2004). 
17 Patricia Shipley, Heidi Mason, eds., Ethics and Socratic Dialogue in Civil Society (Frankfurt: Dipa Verlag, 2004); 
Dries Boele, “The ‘Benefits’ of a Socratic Dialogue, Or: Which Results Can We Promise?”, Inquiry: Critical Thinking 
Across the Disciplines, Vol. XVII, no 3, 1997, 48–70. 
18 Jürgen Habermas, Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion. Philosophische Aufsätze [Between naturalism and religion. 
Philosophical Essays] (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2005); Jürgen Habermas, Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives 
Handeln [Moral consciousness and communicative action] (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1983).  
19  Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen 
Rechtsstaates [Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy] (Frankfurt a.M: 
Suhrkamp, 1992).  
capability of single citizens follow this trajectory. From this perspective, the periphery-centre fluxes 
seem weak and unable to produce effective socio-political changes; however, it is arguably essential 
to reinforce them, precisely for this reason, by creating communicative and dialogical contexts in 
which individuals can experience the critical thinking that characterizes philosophical inquiry. This 
is precisely what Nelson and his disciples attempted to accomplish. In Habermassian terms, we 
could say that, insofar as the flows coming from the centre tend to condition individuals and to 
hinder their capacity of critical thinking confining them to a solitude stemming from fear of the 
other, it is crucial to work on the pressure and pushes operating from the periphery towards the 
centre and to educate people in order for them to become main actors in such propulsive 
movements. 
 In a theory of communicative action, those participating in the dialogue demonstrate their 
willingness to engage in a critical revision of the traditions transmitted by their socio-cultural 
background. In reality, however, this operation clashes with habits that they unavoidably embody, 
often unconsciously. Frequently, prejudices can be so rooted in the identitarian structure and 
language of the participants that they are not only un-removable, they are also virtually 
undetectable. The openness or sincerity representing an essential condition for an effective 
relational communication can be thus compromised from the outset.  
 In this perspective, it is necessary to emphasize the crucial importance and actuality of the 
Socratic method, which implies, first and foremost, the unmasking of conceptual errors and 
conditionings that disempower the interlocutors. Nelson intends philosophical teaching to be a 
practice capable of weakening those influences hindering the development of philosophical 
knowledge in students and that can also reinforce those supporting such a development. Nelson’s 
conception does not thus oppose in principle the exercise of influence on the learner: he is fully 
aware of the pedagogical antinomy that constitutes the Socratic method itself, whereby freedom is 
“forced” upon the interlocutors. The Socratic method is, however, a form of conditioning that 
produces freedom of thought rather than dogmatism  (characterizing the conditioning of power).  
  
 The Politics of Care 
	
Specht’s work provides evidence about the dialogical effectiveness in the establishment of an 
empathic context for the philosophical inquiry. For Specht, the other’s needs and emotions should 
be recognized as a crucial component of the experience that will be further analyzed through the 
critiques of judgments, in Nelson’s terms. In the meantime, the relationship of reciprocal trust can 
be performed within the practice. This affective environment needs to be created through 
continuous and daily practices of care for the others, and for the environment in which they live. 	
 Therefore, experiencing the Socratic dialogue from this embodied perspective implies the 
recognition of the affective dimension of the experience that is at the basis of the philosophical 
inquiry. More specifically, the quest that runs is moved by love and care for the others prompts 
participants not only to be more motivated in their search, but also to establish affective relations 
that will nurture the practice itself. Specht’s experience is similar to what Martha Nussbaum has 
depicted as “cultivating humanity.” In actual fact, this practice involves not only sympathy, 
imagination and respect, but something closer to love and compassion. For Nussbaum those are the 
emotions that we should nurture in order to construct our humanity,20 which the Socratic dialogue 
allows in my understanding of Specht’s experience. 	
 The community of inquiry, in which individuals think with-one-another 
(miteinanderdenken, in Heckmann’s words21), comes thus to define a central educational task. The 
																																								 																				
20 Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions. Why Love matters for Justice (New York and London: Belknap Press, 2013). 
21 Heckmann, Gustav, Das sokratische Gespräch, Erfharungen in philosophischen Hochschulseminaren [Socratic 
dialogue, experiences in high school classes]. See also Detlef Horster, Das Sokratische Gespräch in Theorie und Praxis 
[Socratic Dialogue in Theory and Practice] (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1994).  
Socratic dialogue becomes a device in which the youths can think alone (i.e., independently) while 
not being alone. With Specht’s experience, philosophy extends its power as political action by 
shaping a specific form of dialogical education.	
 The central role Specht ascribes to emotions – in particular, love and vulnerability – and the 
specific way of life experienced in her “schools of life” were the keys to pursuing an effective 
dialogue amongst the children. By encouraging a sense of shared responsibility for human care and 
building trust in humanity, this kind of Socratic dialogue was understood as a key practice in 
reaching a real intercultural dialogue as a response to and prevention of the hatred perpetrated by 
the Nazi power. 
 By emphasizing the value of emotions in dialogue, this model aims to nurture the affective 
intentionality embodied and embedded in the collective process of questing.22 The self acquires thus 
an ethical horizon within a context of transformation. In this perspective, emotions are not to be 
intended as merely private phenomena, but as those intersubjective powers that are at the basis of 
the political valence of the ethics of care and of the dialogue as a world-transformative action. 
Affectivity constitutes the identity of the agent by shaping the relational nexus with the others and 
the context. Caring for the quality of relations also involves the promotion of a politics of care 
since, as Fiona Mackay has argued,23 the politics should be grounded in the same acts of loving care 
for the others.	
 
 Conclusion 
	
This essay has attempted to demonstrate how the fulcrum of the relation between the Socratic 
dialogue and politics can be individuated in everyday philosophical practice, pursued in the social 
dimension of relationships, and intended as an educational device that aspires for the transformation 
of the epistemic agent and of her/his environment. I maintain that this aspect, notwithstanding the 
differences referable to their historical context of development, is central to both the ancient method 
and the German version of the Socratic dialogue.	
 For Plato, the task of education is not only to purify one from the influence of “bad 
teachers”; it is also to form worthy human beings (the project of the Academy) and right laws (the 
project that accompanied Plato into his old age and led him to write the Laws). Paideia was in fact 
the lodestar that had always guided Plato’s questing – a questing that unfolded as a continuous 
definition of the practice of philosophy, aiming at providing an alternative to the politics of his days 
and educating a new humanity.  
 The German method can be considered as the worthier heir amongst the proliferation of 
practices inspired by the Socratic dialogue, especially if we take as the main parameter of 
evaluation the existential nexus connecting philosophical dialogue, education and politics. The 
analysis of the figure of Minna Specht, in particular, can be considered at the same time as the more 
concrete exemplification of the existence of this nexus and as an expression of its effectiveness in 
facing its history. 
																																								 																				
22 Jan Slaby’s account on affective intentionality emphazises how the affective world-directed intentionality is 
essentially bodily. This idea, which is crucial for the contemporary debates in philosophy of emotions and affective 
studies, seems to be equally relevant for depicting Specht’s experience. Specht, despite avoiding the recognition of the 
value of the affective environment where the philosophical inquiry took place, employed specific educational methods 
to create a proper setting for the inquiry, starting from bodily awareness. In this way, the experience that is at the 
ground of every philosophical analysis, in Nelson’s and Fries’ terms, is the embodied, embedded, enactive and affective 
experience of the student. See Jan Slaby, “Affective intentionality and the feeling body”, Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, 2008, Vol.7(4), 429-444.  
23 In line with Gilligan’s approach about the differences between justice and ethics of care. Fiona Mackay, 2001. Love 
and Politics. Women Politicians and the Ethics of Care. (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2001); Carol 
Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, (Cambridge, MA, and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1982). 
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